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CORPORATE INDEMNIFICATION
OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS:
TIME FOR A REAPPRAISAL
K.G. Jan Pillai*
Craig Tractenberg**
Corporations and their regulators have considered at great
length the propriety of indemnifying corporate executives for liability and litigation expenses. 1 The economic and policy implications of indemnification have assumed such importance in recent years, though, as to merit reexamination of the permissible·
limits of the practice. In 1980 alone, one of every ten Fortunelisted companies2 confronted litigation seeking personal liability
against either a director or an officer,8 with a substantial number
of claims being brought by stockholders alleging mismanagement or other breaches of fiduciary duty." As corporate execu• Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. B.A., L.L.M., 1965, Kerala University, India; L.L.M., 1967, J.S.D., 1969, Yale University.
•• Associate, Abraham, Pressman & Bauer, P.C., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. B.A.,
1978, LaSalle College; J.D., 1981, Temple University School of Law.
1. See Bates & Zuckert, Directors' Indemnity: Corporate Policy or Public Policy?, 20
HARV. Bus. REV. 244 (1942). Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., has been at the forefront of
the entire corporate indemnification issue and has authored many instructive works on
the subject. See G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, INDEMNIPYING THE CORPORATE ExEcUTIVE
n963); Bishop, Current Status of Corporate Directors' Right to Indemnification, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1956); Bishop, New Cure For an Old Ailment: Insurance Against
Directors' and Officers' Liability, 22 Bus. LAW 92 (1966); Bishop, Sitting Ducks and

Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers,
77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968); Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht, Liabilities Which Can Be Covered Under State Statutes and Corporate By-Laws, 27 Bus. LAw, Feb. 1972 Special
Issue, at 109; Bishop, Protecting Corporate Executives Against Liability and Expense
Under the Federal Securities Law: Potential Liability, in PROTECTING THE CORPORATE
OFFICER AND DIRECTOR FRoM LIABILITY 155 (PLI Course Handbook Series No. 25, 1969).
2. Fortune-listed companies are the 1300 domestic companies listed annually in Fortune Magazine; they comprise the 1000 largest industrials plus the 50 largest each among
banks and diversified financial, life insurance, retail, transportation, and utility
companies.
3. THE WYATT Co., THE 1980 WYATT DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY AND FmucIARY LIABILITY SURVEY 6 [hereinafter cited as 1980 WYATT SURVEY]. The Wyatt Company
surveyed 2247 United States corporations, 53% of them Fortune-listed, through a confidential questionnaire which asked about losses arising from director and officer liability,
the prevalence of insurance and claims, and their costs. References to "a single claini"
means each class action suit or each group of similar clainiants bringing an action as a
result of a single alleged occurrence.
·
4. Id. at 16. Of the 1980 claims, 40.3% were brought by stockholders.

101

102

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 15:1

tives .become more vulnerable to litigation initiated by forces
within the corporation, their desire increases for protective devices, such as indemnification, which effectively can insulate
them from personal liability. 11
In 1980, American corporations paid over fifty-two million
dollars in director and officer insurance premiums.6 The prevalence of this insurance is understandable in light of the magnitude and incidence of the risks involved. More than one quarter
of major publicly held domestic companies have had at least one
claim against their executives between 1971 and 1980.7 In 1980,
the average total claim cost8 resulting from indemnification was
estimated to be almost one million dollars. 9 Of this amount, the
average defense cost was nearly $320,000 - ·an increase of approximately seventy-five percent over 1974 defense costs. 10
The potentially crushing personal liability which may arise
from these lawsuits11 creates a dilemma for the corporation: balancing the need for punishing the willing wrongdoer against the
need to protect dynamic fiduciaries involved in good-faith efforts
to increase profits. Corporate indemnification of executive risk
and exposure thus becomes a matter of great public concern in
seeking that middle ground where capable managers, subject to
inordinate personal risk, are encouraged to serve, yet discour5. See Rout, Job of Corporate Director Becomes More Susceptible to Legal Assault,
Wall St. J., March 3, 1981, at 33, col. 4.
6. 1980 WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, table 28, at 73-75. See also Greenberg & Dean,
Protecting the Corporate Executives: Director and Officer Liability Insurance Re-evaluated, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 555, 556 n.3 (1975).
Corporations prefer to purchase insurance and pay premiums, notwithstanding that
claims covered by insurance legally could be reimbursed by the corporation out of its
own loss reserves. 1980 WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 23-24. For the 19 companies
responding to the survey that had assets aggregating over $2 billion and had policy limitations of $50 million, the average premium paid in 1980 was $168,012. Id. Of the 51 ~o- of
Fortune-listed companies participating in the survey, 93% purchase D & 0 policies to
protect their executives. In 1980, 95.6% of New York Stock Exchange companies purchased D & 0 insurance, compared to 70.4% in 1973. Similarly, D & 0 insurance coverage for American Stock Exchange companies increased to 89.3% in 1980, from 47% in
1973. Id. at 41.
7. 1980 WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 7. About one in every 20 large companies
(assets between $400 million and $1 billion) had at least one claim in any given year
between 1971 and 1980. Id. at 9.
8. The average total claim cost consists of the average annual loss to the corporation
plus the expense of legal defenses, i.e., the total amount of all losses and all legal defenses divided by the number of claims reported in the survey. Id. at 26.
9. Id. at 27.
.
10. Id. at 12. The average total cost of successful claims was a staggering $1,196,000,
of which $877,361 represents the average recovery by each claimant.
11. For comprehensive works on the subject of substantive liabilities of directors and
officers, see M. FEUER, PERSONAL LJABILITIBS OP CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIREcrORS (2d
ed. 1974); W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OP CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIREcroRS (2d ed. 1973).
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aged from violating their positions of trust.
This Article evaluates the benefits.and burdens of shifting litigation risk from management to the enterprise. The Article begins by considering the nature of the legal risks confronting the
corporate executive, and the principles of common law that developed to counter those risks. The Article proceeds to assess
the two statutory responses to threats of personal liability
against the corporate executive: indemnification statutes, and director and officer insurance. Finally, after comparing the effective absolute immunity available to corporate executives with
the qualified immunity enjoyed by high-level government officials, the Article concludes that indemnification practices have
overinsulated the corporate officer from personal liability.

I.

LEGAL RISKS INHERENT IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT

Determining the appropriate allocation of the financial burdens of indemnification should begin by identifying the sources
of potential litigation and the scope of executive liability. Suits
against corpora~ management commonly are grouped into three
distinct categories: 111 derivative suits, third-party suits, and status suits. Derivative suits typically are brought on behalf of the
corporation, third-party suits arise from executive conduct directly affecting third parties, and status suits originate from the
breach of statutory duties imposed by virtue of executive status.
A.

The Derivative Action

The most common legal risks facing the corporate executive
arise from shareholder derivative actions. 13 These actions are
based upon an asserted wrong to the corporation, with the plaintiff seeking money damages or other relief for the benefit of the
corporation.14 Corporate executives, absent indemnification, bear
the brunt of the successful derivative action. A director or officer
12. See Bishop, New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance Against Directors' and
Officers' Liability, 22 Bus. LAW. 92 (1966).
13. See generally 2 G. WASHINGTON & V.H. ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THB CoRPo•
875-930 (3d ed. 1962).
14. Typically, plaintiffs in derivative actions ar:e shareholders of the injured corpora•
tion. But see Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971),
wherein plaintiffs were not shareholders of the insolvent corporations but had standing
to sue on behalf of an undercapitslized corporation for the benefit of the creditors of the
insolvent corporation.
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may be the target of a suit if he seizes a corporate opportunity,1 5
engages in self-dealing with regard to compensation,1 6 reaps unreasonable reimbursement or payment of proxy expenses,17 or
becomes entangled in stock repurchases by an issuing corporation.18 Derivative suits have been used successfully to attack decisions of disinterested directors who engage in needless financing,19 effect a merger in derogation of the statutory rights of
dissenting shareholders,20 or adopt policies inconsistent with antitrust and trade regulation legislation.21 Merely refraining from
conscious wrongdoing may not always suffice to insulate management from "honest negligence";22 even the most conscientious director or officer may be found liable for conduct reasonably regarded by him as ethical and prudent, especially where
confusion exists among jurisdictions regarding the formulation
of the business judgment rule, an affirmative defense to the derivative action. 23 .
15. See, e.g., Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Kassab, 325 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1963); Irving Trust
Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 708 (1934); Guth v. Loft,
Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939). See also Central Ry. Signal Co. v.
Longden, 194 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1952); Craig v. Graphic Arts Studio, Inc., 39 Del. Ch.
447, 166 A.2d 444 (1960).
16. See, e.g., Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Seidman, 267 F. Supp. 915 (E.D.N.Y. 1967);
Dwyer v. Tracey, 118 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ill. 1954); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 263 A.D. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d.131 (1941); Indurated Concrete Corp. v.
Abbott, 195 Md. 496, 74 A.2d 17 (1950); Stoiber v. Miller Brewing Co., 257 Wis. 13, 42
N.W.2d 144 (1950).
17. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128
N.E.2d 291 (1955); Neuwirth v. Feeley, 148 N.Y.S.2d 678 (Sup. Ct. 1955), af/'d, 1 A.D.2d
879, 150 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1956). See also Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99
N.E. 138 (1912); Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N.Y. 159 (1879).
18. See Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1962). In regard to
abusive stock repurchases, see SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 6108, 18 SEc.
DOCKET 67 (1979).
19. E.g., Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (failure to
seek competitive bids for financing resulting in waste).
20. E.g., Gilbert v. Burnside, 197 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1959), rev'd, 13 A.D.2d 982,
216 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1961), af/'d per curiam, 11 N.Y.2d 960, 183 N.E.2d 325 (1962).
21. E.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 40 Del. Ch. 335, 182 A.2d 328 (1962).
For the background of this case, see J. BROOKS, Bus1NEss ADVENTURES 199-223 (1969).
See also Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
22. Bishop, supra note 12, at 93.
23. Plaintiff shareholders may be barred from suing derivatively if refusal of the prerequisite shareholder demand on directors was made in the exercise of their sound business judgment. Ash v. International Business Machs., Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied., 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957); Issner
v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966); Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240
P.2d 421 (1952); Brooks v. Brooks Pontiac, Inc., 143 Mont. 256, 389 P.2d 185 (1964); Rice
v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co., 130 N.E.2d 442 {Ohio C.P. 1954); cf. Groel v.
United Elec. Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616, 61 A. 1061 (1905) (business judgment is not a bar
where a "grave doubt" exists as to fairmindedness of the judgment). As to jurisdictional
confusion concerning the degree of care to be exercised by a fiduciary, see H. HENN, LAW
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The major objection to indemnifying the corporate executive
found liable in a derivative suit is that reimbursement violates
the utility of this cause of action. Indemnification in this setting
causes the corporation to repay the executive precisely the
amount received as a result of the derivative action. 24 There may
be less objection, however, to indemnification of settlement payments in derivative suits because the corporation can derive tangible benefits from prompt resolution of the action. If the corporation wants to encourage rapid disposition of particularly
refractory litigation, reimbursement of settlement payments
may well be to its advantage. 215

B. The Third-Party Action
In contrast to the derivative action, executives may be
threatened with litigation brought on the basis of contract or
legislation rather than on behalf of the corporation itself.28 Such
third-party actions often are difficult to distinguish from derivative suits. They arise, for instance, upon breach of the shareholders' membership contract. A third party might also seek
payment of lawfully declared27 and mandatory dividends,28 enforced inspection of corporate records,29 protection of preemptive rights or other dilution of shareholders' proportional interests, 30 prohibition of wrongful redemptions,31 or relief in proxy
contests. 32 Along with creditors and competitors of the corporaOF CORPORATIONS § 242 (2d ed. 1976). The standard lies between the severe standard of a
common law trustee (the prudent
in the conduct of his own affairs), see Hun v.
Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880), and a less exacting standard, see Briggs v. Spaulding, 141
U.S. 132 (1891); see Comment, Public Policy and Director's Liability Insurance, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 716, 720 (1967).
24. See Bishop, Indemnification of Corporate Directors, Officers and Employees, 20
Bus. LAW. 833, 841 (1965).
25. See Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance, 33 Bus. LAW.
1993, 2009 (1978).
26. See H. HENN, supra note 23, at § 360.
27. E.g., Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 17 F.R.D. 245 (E.D. Pa. 1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d
717 (3d Cir. 1956); Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818 (1914);
In re Booth, 139 Misc. 253, 248 N.Y.S. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
28. E.g., Boardman v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 84 N.Y. 157 (1881); Koppel v. Middle
States Petroleum Corp., 272 A.D. 790, 69 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1947).
29. E.g., In re Hauser v. Hopewell Products, Inc., 10 A.D.2d 876, 201 N.Y.S.2d 252
(1960); Hagy v. Premier Mfg. Corp., 404 Pa. 330, 172 A.2d 283 (1961).
30. E.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Horwitz v. Balaban, 112 F. Supp.
99 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Sheppard v. Wilcox, 210 Cal. App. 2d 53, 26 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1963).
31. E.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Lehrman v.
Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 207 Misc. 314, 138 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
32. E.g., Campell v. Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957).
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tion, the government frequently initiates third-party actions,
such as criminal antitrust proceedings,33 and suits involving
tax:3'' and securities regulations. 35 Commentators foresee development of additional causes of action grounded particularly
upon infringement of civil rights and the failure of corporations
to comply with federal standards governing safety and hiring
practices. 38 Actions to enjoin a proposed merger or consolidation, sale of assets, or dissolution have been permitted as either
derivative or third-party actions. Actions to compel dissolution,
however, hardly benefit the dissolving business entity and therefore are classified as third-party actions.37
Indemnification for the defense of a third-party action seems
eminently justifiable. The great potential for strike suits38 creates a legitimate need to protect both individual executives and
the corporate image. Also, third-party actions commonly involve
no breach of duties owed to the corporation, making indemnification more palatable than it might be in a derivative suit.

C.

The Status Suit

The corporate executive confronts a third category of litigation risk imposed by virtue of his status.39 Federal securities
laws create such status obligations by requiring special conduct
of corporate fiduciaries towards third parties. Perhaps the best
example of status liability is that imposed by section 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.•0
Section 16(b) provides that a corporate issuer of securities
may recapture any profits41 - arising within six months after
the sale or purchase of those securities - that are realized by an
officer, director, or ten-percent-beneficial owner of the corporation. Whether these profits are engendered by inside informa33. E.g., Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 279 A.D. 996, 112 N.Y.S.2d 146
(1952), atf'd, 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d 533 (1953).
34. E.g., United States v. Fox, 95 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Pa. 1951); Du Puy v. Crucible
Steel Co., 288 F. 583 (W.D. Pa. 1923).
35. See Bishop, supra note 12, at 95.
36. See Greenberg & Dean, supra note 6, at 558.
37. See H. HENN, supra note 23, at § 361.
38. A "strike suit" is brought solely for the purpose of harassing management, in the
hope of a direct payoff to the stockholder plaintiff. Bishop, supra note 12, at 94.
39. Id. at 95.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
41. Profits are maximized by matching the lowest priced purchases against the highest priced sales. See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920
(1951) (judgment against defendant for reconstructed profit despite actual loss of
$300,000).
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tion is immaterial;42 sectionl6(b) has been termed a "Russian
Roulette" provision, for it often applies to reproachless
situations:' 3
Status liability results also from implied civil actions under
Securities Act of 1934 section lO(b), and rule IOb-5." These provisions impose special duties on insiders to disclose material in,.
side information, or to abstain from market disruption, for the
purpose of prohibiting fraud, deceit, or the use of a manipulative
device in connection with the sale or purchase of securities." 5 Liability under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933"8 may be
imposed where a director fails to make an adequate "due diligence" search before the requisite signing of a registration statement to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
in connection with a public offering of securities."7
'
The federal securities laws likely did not contemplate creation
of status liability in excessive amounts. Corporate executives,
however, quickly realized the potential for substantial legal expenses arising from suits brought under the various federal statutes. Thus, in an effort to minimize the impact of status suits, as
well as to avoid crushing liability arising from derivative and
third-party actions, corporate executives sought common law
rules favoring indemnification.
JI.

INDEMNIFICATION AT COMMON LAW

Principles of agency constituted the most appropriate vehicle
at common law for granting the corporate executive relief from
liability. These common law principles, however, while entitling
42. Maqida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972
(1956).
43. See Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1036 (1970) (holding Martin Marietta Corp. liable as an inside director of Sperry
Rand Corp.).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (1981). The scope of rule l0b-5
has been narrowed by judicial interpretation. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
45. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
47. See Escott v. Bar Chris Constr., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding a
signatory to a false registration statement personally liable for losses suffered by debenture holders, notwithstanding that he had not been a director for 48 hours prior to the
filing).
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an agent to exoneration"s from the principal for damages incurred in the performance of authorized duties, did not permit
indemnification of expenses incurred in all types of corporate litigation.49 The common law rule was particularly inadequate in
failing to provide reimbursement to the agent who successfully
defended a suit brought by the principal itself. 110 Thus, the law
of agency stands reticent regarding the most recurring problem
posed by derivative actions: whether, and under what circumstances, there can be indemnification of the executive acting as
agent who presents a successful defense against the corporation
as principal.
In derivative actions decided under common law principles,
courts uniformly have denied reimbursement to unsuccessful
corporate defendants. 111 Since the earliest cases, however, actions
involving successful defendants have proved more problematic.
Because the successful defense of a derivative action rarely, if
ever, will directly benefit the defeated corporation, the early
courts struggled with the conflict between the equitable notion
of reimbursement and the axiom that corporate funds should be
expended only if tangible benefits would accrue to the corporation. As a result, some courts granted indemnification;112 others
denied it, absent unanimous shareholder approval, unless the
corporate directors seeking indemnification could show "some
48. For the purposes of discussion, no legal distinction of exoneration is made between direct corporate payments to defense counsel and reimbursement of executives for
out-of-pocket payments.
49. See Bibb v. Allen, 149 U.S. 481, 498 (1893); Differential Steel Car Co. v. Macdonald, 180 F.2d 260, 270 (6th Cir. 1950); Sunset-Sternau Food Co. v. Bonzi, 60 Cal. 2d 834,
389 P.2d 133, 36 Cal. Rptr. 741 (Cal. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 439(c)
(1957); Johnston, supra note 25.
50. See Cory Bros. & Co. v. United States, 51 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1931); Buckley v.
City of New York, 170 Misc. 412, 415, 10 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 264 A.D.
116, 34 N.Y.S.2d 577, aff'd, 289 N.Y. 742, 46 N.E.2d 352 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY§ 438, comment l (1958); G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 1, at 95 &
n.63.
51. See, e.g., McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 F. 103 (8th Cir. 1906); Wickersham v.
Crittenden, 106 Cal. 329, 39 P. 603 (1895); Chabot & Richard Co. v. Chabot, 109 Me. 403,
84 A. 892 (1912).
52. See, e.g., Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 109 N.W. 581 (1906), where a director
sought recovery, in his capacity as stockholder, from other members of the board for
fraud and misapplication of corporate funds. Although not strictly speaking a derivative
action, the suit nonetheless was brought for the benefit of the corporation. The court
sustained, without discussion or citation of authority, the use of corporate funds to pay
the expenses of directors during trial and before exoneration, reasoning that "if no case
is made against defendants it is not improper or unjust that the corporation should pay
for the defense of the action." Id. at 625, 109 N.W. at 592. But cf. Jesse v. Four Wheel
Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627, 189 N.W. 276 (1922) (holding that corporate funds could
not be used to defend directors in litigation involving their personal dealings with stockholders rather than their management of corporate affairs).
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benefit to the corporation or that some interest of the corporation was threatened."118
This confuson reached its peak in New York Dry Dock Company, Inc. v. McCollum/'' a decision denying reimbursement for
expenses incurred in the successful defense of a derivative action. The court found that the defendant directors had failed to
carry their burden of establishing either that the suit had preserved a substantial corporate interest or had generated benefits
for the corporation. 1111 The McCollum decision, perceived as rejecting a common law right to reimbursement of expenses absent
express legislative authorization,116 caused panic in Albany and
on Wall Street alike. Directorates scurried to amend corporate
bylaws, execute employment contracts, and correspond with political representatives in an effort to circumvent the adverse consequences of the decision. 117
Since the ;McCollum episode, the trend has been to recognize
the rights of an innocent director to indemnification.118 For example, the New Jersey case of Solimine v. Hollander" 9 granted
53. Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 558, 175 N.E. 222, 223 (1931); see Drivas v.
Lekas, 182 Misc. 567, 48 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Neuberger v. Barrett, 180 Misc.
222, 39 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1942). These courts apparently failed to recognize the
wide range of benefits that might cause a corporation to indemnify its executives, especially the benefit of indemnification in inducing competent executives to accept corporate positions. See G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 1, at 87; Frampton, Indemnification of Insiders' Litigation Expenses, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. Paon., 325, 327-28 (1958).
54. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939). The defendant's name is properly
spelled "McCollom." G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 1, at 87 n.39.
55. The suit, brought by the corporation against certain of its directors, was for a
declaratory judgment to resist payment of their expenses. It was alleged that these directors had successfully defended a derivative suit brought against them and had successfully prevented the appointment of a receiver. The court held that the directors were not
entitled to _reimbursement, for the following reasons: no disinterested approval of the
reimbursement was obtained; no implied contract of Jaw required reimbursement; no
corporate benefit was bestowed by the directors (referee found that dismissal of the petition for receivership was due to the sole efforts of corporate counsel); the settled state of
the Jaw rejected any policy arguments in favor of indemnification; and it would have
been more appropriate to bring the reimbursement claim before the trial judge in the
original suit, who would be "in a much better position than any judge to evaluate the
alleged benefits to the corporation of the legal services rendered." 173 Misc. at 113; 16
N.Y.S.2d at 850; see G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 1, at 87-90.
56. See Bailey v. Bush Terminal Co., 46 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct.), alf'd mem., 267
A.O. 899, 48 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1943), aff'd mem., 293 N.Y. 735, 56 N.E.2d 739 (1944). Note
that Bailey was decided subsequent to passage of the New York indemnification statutes, chs. 209, 350, 1941 N.Y. LAWS 164th Sess. (current version at N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§§ 722, 723 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1980-1981)).
57. The result, only two years later, was the nation's first indemnification statute,
drafted specifically to displace the effects of McCollum. See G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP,
supra note 1, at 87.
58. See Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888, 895-98 (3d Cir. 1953).
59. 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (1941).
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indemnification on the theory that the defense and vindication
of management itself constituted a benefit to the corporation,
going so far as to repudiate the necessity to demonstrate corporate benefits where the director had been successful on the merits. The court said: "[T]he right to reimbursement is a circumstance that would actuate and induce responsible business men
to accept the post of directors, the emoluments of which would
otherwise never be commensurate with the risk of loss involved
in paying out of their own pocket the costs involved in defending
their conduct."80

Ill.

INDEMNIFICATION STATUTES

A.

The Early Statutes

Despite the clearly discernible common law trend favoring indemnification, the vast majority of states still found it prudent
to enact special statutes granting the right or power of indemnification.81 In response to the McCollum case,82 corporate executives induced legislative adoption of protective bylaw provisions
and statutes68 assuring indemnification. Thus, almost all American jurisdictions, beginning with New York in 1941" and followed by Delaware in 1943,811 have enacted statutes authorizing
and regulating indemnification of litigation expenses incurred by
corporate executives.88
The statutes, as originally enacted, contained a number of defects enabling untoward judicial interpretations. For instance,
the old Delaware statute was flawed because merely permissive;
it did not give the executive an enforceable right to be indemni60. Id. at 272, 19 A.2d at 348; accord, In re E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 214-15,
45 N.W.2d 388, 393 (1950).
61. S~e Mattar & Hilson, Exposure of Corporate Directors: An Oueruiew of Indemnification and Liability Insurance, 46 J. RISK & INs. 411, 412 (1979).
62. See notes 54-57 and accompanying text supra.
63. See generally G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 1, at 112-205.
64. Chs. 209, 350, 1941 N.Y. LAWS 164th Seas. {current version at N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAW §§ 722, 723 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1980-1981)).
65. Ch. 125, 44 Del. Laws 109th Sess. (1943) {current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 145(c) (1974)).
66. Apparently state regulation was prompted by indemnification bylaws that aimed
to grant management total immunity from personal liability. The public policy justifying
statutory regulation arose out of bylaws permitting executives adjudged guilty in derivative actions to be indemnified for the very funds they had extracted from the corporate
fisc. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1079 (1968).
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fied. 67 Furthermore, the statute failed to distinguish between derivative and third-party actions, thus seeming to forbid indemnification in a third-party action when the executive was adjudged
liable for actions done with intent to further corporate interests.
The statute did not specifically cover criminal, administrative,
or investigative proceedings, nor did it embrace counsel expenses
incurred in threatened litigation. Finally, the defect most troubling to executives in the old statutes, such as Delaware's, was the
absence of an express provision dealing with compromise
settlements. 68

B. The Modern Statutes
Through a series of amendments and revisions, state legislatures sought to clarify the original indemnification statutes in
order to cure the apparent deficiencies. Following the revision of
the Model Business Corporation Act of 1967,69 the Delaware
statute became a prototype for other states. An analysis of these
statutes is needed for a clear understanding of the varying degrees of risks and liabilities to which corporate executives currently are exposed.
Modern indemnification statutes may be divided into two
broad categories: mandatory and permissive. Mandatory statutes
require indemnification by corporations upon satisfaction of certain statutory prerequisites. This mandatory approach represents an improvement over earlier formulations because it provides an enforceable right against the corporate entity.
Permissive statutes, in contrast, grant the corporation an option
to indemnify its executives when specified conditions are met.
While permissive statutes enable a corporation to guarantee indemnification by incorporating appropriate indemnification
clauses in bylaws, charters, or employment contracts, such an
option places undue emphasis on drafting and creates potential
conflicts should the provision overstep the bounds of corporate
responsibility for indemnification.70
67. See Johnston, supra note 25, at 1995.
68. See Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 351, 182 A.2d
647, 652 (1962) (Chancellor was troubled by "the unhealthy consequence of placing a
director in the position where he would be assured of indemnification if he settled but
would run the risk of paying his own attorney if he unsuccessfully resisted the action");
Bishop, supra note 66, at 1082-83.
69. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr. § 5 (1967).
70. Courts have demonstrated a willingness to invalidate directors' attempts to indemnify themselves pursuant to bylaw or charter provisions. See Teren v. Howard, 322
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Both mandatory and permissive statutes may be further subdivided based upon whether they grant exclusive or nonexclusive
methods of indemnification. An exclusive statute permits indemnification only as expressly provided in · the statute. Under
nonexclusive statutes, corporations may be creative in devising
methods to protect their executives. The risk of personal liability for the executive, however, still exists under nonexclusive
statutes, because the method devised could be rendered void if
the corporate authorization exceeds the bounds of public policy.
Mandatory statutes, such as those in Delaware,71 New York,72
and Pennsylvania,7 s require indemnification of reasonable litigation expenses only if the director is "successful on the merits or
otherwise." 7' To illustrate the scope of these mandatory provisions, the Delaware statute enables a corporation to indemnify
in third-party litigation against expenses, judgments, fines, and
amounts paid in settlement. The right to indemnification in the
case of derivative actions, though, is limited to expenses, including attorneys' fees, provided the defendant is not found liable
for negligence or misconduct.715
The statutes clearly provide for indemnification when the executive has been "wholly" successful on the merits. Significant
jurisdictional differences arise, however, when the executive does
not obtain a "wholly" successful verdict.76 The New York statute, for instance, requires that the executive be entirely vindicated to obtain indemnification.77 Given that the New York statute is exclusive, a corporation likely could not even indemnify
F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963) (efforts of directors to idemnify themselves for expenses incurred in derivative litigation held invalid); SEC v. Continental Growth Fund, (19641966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 91,437 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647 (1962) (board resolution
held invalid as an effort to idemnify themselves for counsel fees incurred in a courtapproved settlement).
71. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1974).
72. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 724(a) (McKinney 1963).
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410(c) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
74. The "successful on the merits" language requires that the executive seeking indemnification be found either not guilty in a criminal case or not liable in a civil case.
See Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at 413. The "or otherwise" statutory language contemplates that indemnification may be available where the action was dismissed with
prejudice, for whatever reason. Id. In contrast, California requires success on the merits
for mandatory indemnification, CAL. CORP. CODE§ 317(d) (West Supp. 1981); see Heyler,
Indemnification of Corporate Agents, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1255 (1976), although nonmeritorious termination would not preclude indemnification if the defendant fell within
the permissive provisions of the statute. CAL. CORP. CODE§ 317(c)(l) (West Supp. 1981).
75. If the defendant is adjudged liable for misconduct or negligence, the court has
discretion to award indemnity for expenses. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1974).
76. Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, ~t 413.
77. See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW. §§ 724(a), 725(a) (McKinney 1963).
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permissively in this instance.78
This signifies an apparent disadvantage of the New York statute in comparison with those of other jurisdictions. Under the
California, Delaware, and Pennsylvania enactments, for example, executives are entitled to indemnification "to the extent" of
success. The Delaware statute explicitly provides for partial indemnity upon partial success,79 even should the success not bear
upon the merits of the case. 80
This disadvantage, however, may be more illusory than real.
In Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 81 the Delaware
Superior Court held that partial dismissal of charges of perjury,
obstruction of justice, and fraud would not entitle the defendant
executives to indemnification for legal fees. Despite the Delaware statutory provisions supporting indemnification in this
context, the court concluded that it would be "anomalous indeed, and diametrically opposed to the spirit and purpose of the
[indemnification] statute and sound public policy to extend the
benefits of indemnification to these defendants under the facts
and circumstances of this case."82 Thus, the common law principle that public policy bars enforcement of indemnification contracts where parties have engaged in fraudulent or willful misconduct serves as a gloss upon the limitations established
explicitly by the indemnification statutes. 83
78. See Johnston, supra note 25, at 2000; Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at 414.
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1974); see Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v.
Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
80. See Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, et 414. Under the California statute, in order to gain partial indemnification, the defendant must partially succeed on the merits.
Id.
81. 264 A.2d 358 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970).
82. Id. at 360. In a subsequent phase of the same case, however, the court did allow
partial indemnification for expenses arising from criminal charges that had been dismissed. 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
Public policy always has been an oveniding limitation on the interpretation and application of state indemnification statutes. In Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 120
N.E.2d 819 (1954), for instance, the New York Court of Appeals denied indemnification
to a successful defendant in a stockholders' suit, dismissed on the basis of plaintiff's
participation in an alleged conspiracy to waste corporate assets, where the defendant had
been an equal participant in the scheme. Similarly, in People v. Uran Mining Corp., 13
A.D.2d 419, 216 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1961), a director successful on the merits nonetheless was
denied indemnification for the defense of a suit alleging fraudulent conduct in securities
transactions, because the defendant had at least participated in the transactions and had
breached his fiduciary responsibility of good faith.
83. See Kansas City Operating Corp. v. Durwood, 278 F.2d 354, 358 (8th Cir. 1960)
(indemnitee found in pari delicto with the indemnitor); Pruet v. Dugger-Holmes & Assocs., 162 So. 2d 613 (Ala. 1964); Johnston, supra note 25, et 2006-07.
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Statutory Recovery and the Requisite Standard of
Conduct

The corporate executive can incur substantial expenses, such
as attorneys' fees, fines, and settlement costs, whenever named
as a defend ant in a derivative suit. The statutes permit the executive defendant in derivative suits, however, to seek recovery
only of litigation expenses; indemnification of the judgment
would merely circulate the indemnity amount back to the injured corporation in the form of damages without making the
corporation whole.8 ' Under the Delaware and Pennsylvania statutes, a court has discretion to indemnify an executive against
expenses, including attorneys' fees, arising from the defense of a
derivative suit, notwithstanding a finding of misconduct. The
New York statute, in contrast, does not permit the court to
grant indemnification if it finds that the executive engaged in
misconduct. 85
The statutes enable permissive indemnification by the corporation in derivative actions under a strict standard of conduct,
requiring the defendant to have acted in good faith and in the
corporate interest.86 While the business judgment rule will provide limited protection to executives for mere errors in judgment, it will not insulate from liability the executive who fails to
exercise due diligence. The executive who fails to ascertain the
facts necessary to enable reasoned decisionmaking falls short of
the standard of conduct necessary for permissive
indemnification.87
The standard of care required for indemnification in thirdparty and status suits is generally more liberal because the defendant executive owes a duty not to the corporation, but rather
to other aggrieved parties. Under the restrictive New York and
California statutes, indemnification requires a good-faith, reasonable belief that the conduct was in the best interest of the
corporation. 88 The broader language of the Delaware and Pennsylvania enactments permits indemnification when an officer has
acted "in or not opposed to" the best interests of the corpora84. See Bishop, supra note 12, at 841.
85. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
86. See CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 317(c) (West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)
(1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410(b) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
87. See Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at 418.
88. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 723(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); CAL. CoRP. CODE§
317(b) (West Supp. 1981).
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tion, 89 thus more readily enabling indemnification where, for instance, liability is based on status.90
In contrast to the derivative action, where only litigation expenses are recoverable, the statutes empower the unsuccessful
executive in a third-party action to seek indemnification as well
for judgments, amounts paid in settlement, and fines. The New
York statute is exceptional in its treatment of expenses incurred
from threatened litigation: the executive can be indemnified for
these costs in third-party but not derivative suits. 91 Most other
statutes provide for the advancement of litigation expenses even
in threatened derivative suits. While advancement of funds appears proper in third-party actions, though, the concept seems
self-defeating when the corporation effectively subsidizes the defendant executive - its party opponent. This apparent circularity of funds is mitigated, however, by provisions that the advances are to be repaid upon a determination that the
indemnification is improper.92
The courts carefully evaluate the propriety of indemnification
in status liability actions. Because status cases generally are
brought pursuant to ·federal securities laws, these laws have
played a major role in limiting indemnification.93 In general, the
stance of the Securities and Exchange Commission has been that
indemnification would reduce the ability of the federal provisions to deter negligent or reckless misconduct in the issuance,
purchase, or sale of securities.9 ' This approach is exemplified in
Securities Act rule 460, permitting the SEC to refuse acceleration of the effective date of registration statements required in
public distributions, unless there has been a waiver of indemnification with respect to the proposed offering, or unless the parties obtain a judicial ruling that indemnification would not offend public policy.85
89. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 145(a) (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410(a) (Purdon
Supp. 1981-1982).
90. See Johnston, supra note 25, at 1997.
91. See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §§ 722, 723 (McKinney 1963); Johnston, supra note 25,
at 2001.
92. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 722(b)(l) & (2), 723(a) (McKinney 1963).
93. See Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969)
(underwriter's actual knowledge of omission of material from prospectus prevented enforcement of indemnification provisions of the underwriting agreement), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970); In re Equity Funding Corp., 416 F. Supp. 132, 156 (C.D. Cal. 1975);
Odette v. Shearson Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Gould v. American
Hawaiian Steamship Co., 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 535
F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1831 (2d ed. 1961).
94. See Johnston, supra note 25, at 2008.
95. 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1981). Rule 460 contains no prohibition, however, against

116

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 15:1

Whether SEC policy would invalidate broadly worded, permissive state indemnification statutes remains unresolved.98 The
Delaware statute, for instance, does not require that the executive seeking indemnity have acted in the corporate interest, and
expressly contemplates indemnification where the executive is
sued by reason of serving as a director or officer of another corporation.97 SEC policy likely would dictate that the Delaware
statute spans too broadly in both these regards. 98
The most satisfactory approach to assessing the propriety of
indemnification would be through reference to the purposes of
the federal statute involved. If the federal securities statutes aim
primarily to compensate the defrauded investor, the interest in
enabling defendant executives to present a strong defense would
argue for permitting indemnification. On the other hand, indemnification should not be allowed if the statutes are mainly punitive; the faithless fiduciary would not. be adequately punished if
indemnified.99
D. Determination of Whether the Standard of Conduct Has
Been Met
An independent arbiter must make the determination whether
the statutory standard of conduct required for indemnification
has been satisfied. The Delaware and Pennsylvania statutes both
provide for this determination to be made by a majority of disinterested directors constituting a quorum, the stockholders, or,
indemnification for the expenses of a successful defense. Johnston, supra note 25, at
2009 & n.55. See also Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (holding that federal public policy precludes indemnification for violations of Securities Act § 12(2), or for fraud violations creating liability under rule lOb-5); Gould v.
American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974) (indemnification of
conduct negligent under Securities Exchange Act § 14 would be contrary to public policy
of securities laws), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
96. See Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at 416.
97. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1974).
98. Cf. Globus v. Law Research Service, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969) (indemnification agreement between issuer and underwriter, in light of actual knowledge of violation,
is violative of public policy), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). The SEC has said that
insurance against liabilities arising under the 1933 Act is not against public policy, regardless of who bears the cost. See W. KNEPPER, supra note 11, § 16.03, at 411 & n.34.
99. At least three cases have suggested that the federal securities laws are compensatory rather than punitive, an argument supporting indemnification of the executive defendant in status actions. See Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 576 (4th
Cir. 1969) (dictum), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d
291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
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under certain conditions, an independent legal counsel. 100 The
California statute provides for approval of indemnification either by a majority of disinterested directors or by court order. 101
The New York statute permits indemnification by court order,
approval by a majority of a quorum of disinterested directors, or
by independent legal counsel or shareholder vote if a quorum of
directors is unavailable. 102
Various commentators have found these statutory methods of
independent· determination to be deficient. 103 They argue that
reliance upon indemnification decisions by disinterested directors may be unrealistic, given the inherent difficulty involved in
asking a director to sit in judgment regarding the actions of fellow directors. 104 The constant threat of liability for biased decisions,1015 however, as well as statutorily mandated judicial and
shareholder oversight of directors' indemnification determinations, generally provide substantial safeguards against indemnification awards that unduly favor the guilty director and adversely affect the interests of the corporation.
The notion that outside counsel can provide an adequate
check upon indemnification decisions also has been attacked, because counsel chosen by the board of directors likely will not be
truly independent of the board. Past or expected future business
relationships between the board of directors and chosen counsel
cast doubt upon whether this approach could produce an impartial evaluation of the indemnification decision. 108
The New York provision that permits a trial court to make
the indemnification decision seems to provide the best option.
This approach should be adopted by more states, notwithstanding the possibility that it entails some usurpation of the power
vested in the board of directors to make business decisions.
Court approval of indemnification determinations, coming at the
end of conventional litigation and involving adversary parties,
100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410(d) (Purdon
Supp. 1981-1982).
101. CAL. CoRP. CODE§§ 317(d), (e) (West Supp. 1981). California quite properly ensures some level of shareholder participation in the process by requiring notice to shareholders whenever indemnification exdeeds $10,000. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 1501(b)(2) (West
Supp. 1981).
102. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §§ 724-725 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
103. See Johnston, supra note 25, at 1998; Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht, supra note
1, at 121, 125; Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at 420.
104. See Johnston, supra note 25, at 1998.
105. See Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1942),
atf'd mem. 267 A.D. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944).
106. See Johnston, supra note 25, at 1998-99; Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht, supra
note 1, at 121.
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ensures disinterested decisionmaking and presents the parties in
interest with an adequate opportunity to be heard on the propriety of indemnification.
IV.

DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY INSURANCE

The perceived inadequacies of the state indemnification statutes in sensitive areas such as derivative suit recoveries and coverage for federal securities law violations have inspired legislatures to authorize the purchase of director and officer ("D & 0")
liability insurance. 107 At common law, a corporation's purchase
of D & 0 insurance was considered ultra vires because perceived
entirely as a benefit to the management, with no corresponding
advantage to the corporation.108 In authorizing the purchase of
D & 0 insurance, the state legislatures overcame this common
law objection by finding that this insurance benefits corporations as a means of attracting executive talent.
Most state statutes expressly empower a corporation to insure
executives against liabilities, regardless of whether the corporation itself could indemnify those liabilities. Thus, the standard
D & 0 policy might cover liability arising from damage awards,
settlements, and all manner of litigation expenses. Indeed, state
statutes provide specific authorization for insuring liabilities
107. Forty-two states have adopted such statutes. See ALA. CODE § 10-21-64a(g)
(1975); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.0l0(g) (Supp. 1981); AR1z. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-005.G
(1977); ARK. STAT. § 64-309(G) (1980); CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(i) (West Supp. 1981);
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-lOl(l)(o)(VII) (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320a(f)
(West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.014(8)
(Harrison 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-717(g) (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416-35(h)
(Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-5(g) (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, U 157.42-12(g)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); IND. CODE § 23-1-2-2(10) (1976); lowA CODE ANN. §
496A.4.19.g (West Supp. 198i-1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305(g) (1974); Kv. REv.
STAT. § 271A.025(7) (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:83.F (West 1969); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13-A, § 719(6) (Supp. 1980); Mo. CORP & Ass'NS ANN. § 2-418(k) (Supp. 1981);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 67 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1979); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§
450.1567 (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.095, subd. 7 (West 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
351.355(7) (Vernon Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15)(i) (Supp. 1981); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(9) (West Supp. 1981-1982); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 727 (McKinney
Supp. 1980-1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-19(c) (1975); Omo REV. CODE § 1701.13(E)(3)
(Page 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.43a(g) (West Supp. 1980-1981); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 57.260(4) (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1410.G (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); R.I. GEN.
LAWS§ 7.1-1.4.l(g) (1969); S.C. CODE§ 33-13-180(d) (1976); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 48-406
(1979); TEx. Bus. CORP. Ac::r ANN. art. 2.02(16) (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16.104(0)(7) (1953); VA. CODE § 13.1-3.l(g) (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
23A.08.025(11) (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-9(g) (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
180.05(7) (West Supp. 1981-1982); Wvo. STAT. § 17-1-105.l(f) (Supp. 1981).
108. Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at 420.
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arising from status actions. 1O0 Although the broad scope of D &
0 policies has been severely criticized as insuring every species
of fiduciary misconduct, D & 0 policy exclusions - including
claims arising from defamation, insider self-dealing, unauthorized compensation, fraud, and failure to protect corporate assets110 - ameliorate the potential for abuse.
D & 0 insurance contracts generally consist of two parts.
First, they include provisions for reimbursing the corporation for
payments made to insured parties when the corporation is required or permitted to indemnify pursuant to statutory provisions. 111 Second, policies allow for direct indemnification by the
insurance company in situations where the corporation lacks authority, under its bylaws or under state law, to indemnify the
executive. The authorization to insure executive liability, however, is not absolute: the New York statute, for instance, bars
any payment other than defense costs if a final adjudication establishes that the executive has engaged in active and deliberate
dishonesty or has gained an advantage from the wrongdoing. 112
Moreover, most policies contain substantial deductible amounts
and have co-insurance provisions requiring insureds to bear a
percentage of any loss incurred. 113 The co-insurance and deductible features of D & 0 policies further public policy by creating
disincentives for wrongful conduct, but could be circumvented
by a well-drafted bylaw permitting reimbursement by the corporation to the executive.114
A. D & 0 Insurance and Public Policy

A major policy objection arises in the face of extensive D & 0
liability insurance: executives may be effectively insulated from
the deterrent effects of potential and actual litigation. Professor
Bishop, recognizing the need for deterrence of corporate misbehavior, has argued that an insurance policy indemnifying an ex109. Greenberg & Dean, supra note 6, at 566-68; Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at
421.
110. See Greenberg & Dean, supra note 6, at 577-78.
111. The policy would not cover liabilities incurred by the corporation itself. See
Johnston, supra note 25, at 2013.
112. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 727(b)(l) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). In addition, the
statute specifically mandates that shareholders receive notice of informatioii regarding
the insurance, including the date of purchase, carrier, costs, and executive positions insured. Id. § 727(d).
113. 1980 WYA1T SURVEY, supra note 3, at 54.
114. D & 0 policy limitations vary with the situation at risk, but in 1979 averaged
about $10 million for the Fortune-listed companies. Id. at 27.
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ecutive for breaches of the duties of good faith and due care
should be considered an inherently impermissible act - because
it would be tantamount to an employment contract proclaiming
that the executive owed no fiduciary duty to the corporation.11G
D & 0 insurance policies have come under blistering attack for
enabling a circumvention of state policy by indemnifying risks
which state indemnification statutes would not permit corporations to indemnify absent insurance. At least one state legislature has found this reasoning persuasive; Minnesota has adopted
a statute barring a corporation's purchase of insurance covering
risks which the corporation may not otherwise indemnify. 118 At
bottom, this reflects the sentiment that management should not
be permitted to avoid fiduciary responsibilities through insurance purchased by the corporation.
In defense of D & 0 policies, most exclude from coverage a
substantial portion of those activities that the corporation could
not indemnify on its own. 117 While numerous D & 0 policies
·provide a measure of protection against judgments or settlements in derivative actions, for instance, most exclude from coverage the indemnification of fines or penalties, and claims arising
from dishonest activities or illegal personal gains. 118 Thus, to
some extent, the D & 0 insurance carriers themselves have nullified the critics by requiring appropriate exclusions.119 Moreover,
the legislative enactments under fire merely authorize corporations to pay premiums for D & 0 insurance - insurance carriers
are not permitted to protect against risks in contravention of
public policy.
Another public policy issue is whether intentional conduct
should be indemnifiable.12° Fundamental common law principles
dictate that indemnifying against liability due to a willful wrong
is void as against public policy.121 Certain commentators have
asserted, however, that insurance coverage for intentional, will115. Bishop, supra note 66, at 1091.
116. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301-095, subd. 7 (1969). An alternative approach to the response seen in Minnesota would be to require corporate executives to purchase their own
insurance, mirroring the systems used in the medical and legal professions. Forcing executives to pay their own premiums would separate their personal interests from the business interests of the corporation. But cf. Note, Indemnification of Directors, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 1429 (1963) (if individuals purchase insurance, there will be a loss of the economies
of scale available when a corporation purchases insurance for many executives).
117. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
118. See Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht, supra note 1, at 110.
119. See note 98 supra.
120. Scienter assumes increased significance since its recent establishment as an element in l0h-5 offenses. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
121. See Johnston, supra, note 25, at 2024; Note, supra note 116, at 648.

FALL 1981]

Corporate Indemnification

121

ful, fraudulent, or criminal conduct should be permitted where
the deterrent effect of potential liability is minimal. 122 Indeed,
the common law supports this proposition to some extent, permitting indemnification of a corporate agent acting in the corporate interest without knowledge of illegality, even should the
agent be found criminally liable for the conduct. 123 Additionally,
there exists adequate support for the notion that attorneys' fees
arising out of intentional or criminal conduct should be indemnifiable. In Commissioner v. Tellier, 12' the Supreme Court held
that a broker - heavily fined for a deliberate violation of the
federal securities laws - could deduct for tax puuposes the
costs of his unsuccessful defense as an "ordinary and necessary"
business expense. The Court reasoned that the public interest in
encouraging effective representation justified the allowance of
the deduction for litigation expenses, notwithstanding strong
federal interests in discouraging violations of the securities
laws. 1211 In at least some instances, therefore, Tellier should permit D & 0 insurance carriers to promote effective representation
by indemnifying executives for defense expenses.126
A further question is whether public policy should tolerate the
indemnification of punitive damages. Admittedly, the deterrent
force of punitive damages will be substantially diminished if the
defendant. executive can seek reimbursement from the insurance
carrier. Yet, when compared with the threat of criminal liability
for corporate wrongdoing, punitive damages have only marginal
deterrent impact; if criminal penalties fail to deter executive
wrongdoers, the imposition of punitive damages likely will not
have significant incremental effect.127 Indeed, various jurisdictions that·permit indemnification of fines and penalties - sanctions closely akin to punitive damages - seemingly have found
no public policy obstacle to reimbursement of punitive
damages. 128
122. See Greenberg & Dean, supra note 6, at 583.
123. See Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht, supra note 1, at 124.
124. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
125. Id. at 694.
126. See Greenberg & Dean, supra note 6, at 584; Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht,
supra note 1, at 124.
127. Where the insurance policy does not explicitly exclude punitive damages from
its coverage, there may be substantial judicial reluctance to interfere with the bargain
struck between the insurer and the insured. See Esmond v. Liscio, 224 A.2d 793 (Pa.
Super. 1966); Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at 422.
128. See DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 723 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) (expenses, judgments, fines); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410(a) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982). Treble damages for civil antitrust violations are probably indemnifiable in whole or in part. See Greenberg & Dean, supra note 6, at 586.
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THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE INDEMNIFICATION: RISKSHIFTING. OR IMMUNIZATION?

A. The Compensation Fallacy
Corporations and their executives frequently contend that
shifting the risk of legal liability from corporate officers to the
enterprise is a legitimate means of corporate compensation. The
rationale has been that executives can be compensated through
salary, bonus, or other emoluments, in whatever form. 129 From
this perspective, indemnification represents merely another
fringe benefit, to be grouped with executive expense accounts,
profit-sharing plans, stock options, and deferred compensation
plans.1ao
But in fact, indemnity lacks the essential attributes of compensation. In contrast to the common law requirement that compensation be reasonably related to "past services rendered,"181
129. See G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 1, at 5.
130. On expense accounts, see Rothschild & Soberheim, Expense Accounts for Executives, 67 YALE L.J. 1363 (1958).
Share options are granted to management as an incentive to increase efficiency, which
is reflected in stock price appreciation, thereby rendering the option more valuable. See
Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160 A.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Stock purchase plans offer
shares at favorable prices to employees to encourage responsible conduct by increasing
their ownership interests. See generally 2 G. WASHINGTON & V.H. ROTHSCHILD, supra
note 13, at 613-33. Deferred compensation plans include pensions and annuities in which
cash payments are made after peak income years for the purpose of preventing the sums
from being taxed at the employees' current graduated rate. See generally E. WooD &,J.
CERNY, TAX ASPECTS OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION 15-97 (2d ed. 1969). Fringe benefits
may include life insurance, health and accident insurance, club membership, substantial
discounts on corporate products, home-financing programs, moving expenses, medical examinations, educational opportunities, recreational facilities, guest homes, conventions,
health resorts, limousines and chauffeurs, as well as yachts and crews. See generally
Larkin v. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968); H. HENN, supra note 23, at§ 254; 1
G. WASHINGTON & V.H. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 13, at 165-202.
131. See McNulta v. Corn B.elt Bank, 164 Ill. 427, 45 N.E. 954 (1897); Stratis v. Andreson, 254 Mass. 536, 150 N.E. 832 (1926); Miner 'V. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53
N.W. 218 (1892); Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 189 N.W. 586
(1922); Adams v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 198 Okla. 461, 179 P.2d 147 (1947).
Where compensation is excessive, the recipients, as well as the directors granting the
windfall, are liable for the excess amounts, absent a meritorious defense of sound business judgment. See Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963); Smith v. Dunlap, 269
Ala. 97, 111 So. 2d 1 (1959); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.), atf'd mem., 263
A.D. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1941), motion for leave to appeal denied, 263 A.D. 852, 32
N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1942). Moreover, compensation should be predetermined because retroactive compensation for past services is regarded as a grant without consideration, and
thereby actionable by shareholders as a waste of corporate assets. See Glenmore Distilleries v. Seidman, 267 F. Supp. 915 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co.,
159 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 828 (1947); Spaeth v. Journal Printing Co.,
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the legality of indemnification is determined by statutes, and the
amount of indemnification is based upon actual costs incurred
rather than upon a standard of reasonableness. Further, the executive function creating an indemnifiable liability need not
have been performed for the benefit of the corporation - an
essential prerequisite for any executive compensation. 132 Additionally, in most situations where a corporation offers indemnification as an inducement to newly hired executives, the question
does not even arise as to how the offered indemnification relates
to past services rendered by the executive-beneficiary. Finally,
indemnification differs from compensation because indemnities
are not given at fixed intervals in agreed-upon amounts. In fact,
there may be no occasion for indemnification in any given year,
or indeed in the entire span, of the executive-beneficiary's tenure with the corporation.
The conclusion that indemnification cannot be equated with
executive compensation draws support from the approach taken
by state and federal statutes. State corporation laws do not classify indemnification as a form of compensation;138 similarly, the
Securities and Ex~hange Commission does not require the disclosure of indemnification payments in proxy statements, while
maldng executive compensation a matter of mandatory
disclosure. 184
139 F. Supp. 188, 16 Alaska 149 (D. Alaska 1956); Heise v. Earnshaw Publications, Inc.,
130 F. Supp. 38 (D. Mass. 1955); Beacon Wool Corp. v. Johnson, 331 Mass. 274, 119
N.E.2d 195 (1954); Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818 (1914).
The rule preventing salary compensation for past services does have exceptions: where
an implied contract exists, Landstreet v. Meyer, 201 Miss. 826, 29 So. 2d 653 (1947);
where bonuses customarily are paid to executives at year's-end, Wineburgh v. Seeman
Bros., 21 N.Y.S.2d 180 (Sup. Ct, 1940); where the amount awarded is for the reasonable
value of services rendered, Wiseman v. Musgrave, 309 Mich. 523, 16 N.W.2d 60 (1944); or
where the compensation is ratified by the stockholders, Chambers v. Beaver-Advance ·
Corp., 392 Pa. 481, 140 A.2d 808 (1958); c/. Russell v. Henry C. Patterson Co., 232 Pa.
113, 81 A. 136 (1911) (ratification was voidable because interested officers impermissibly
had voted for ratification). Ratification of retroactive compensation is impermissible
where the result or purpose would be to defraud the corporation, the minority shareholders, or other unprotected interests. Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F.2d 52 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 828 (1947). However, numerous cases hold that an officer or
director may recover the reasonable value of extraordinary services rendered to a corporation upon an implied promise to pay for the services. E.g., Corinne Mill, Canal & Stock
Co. v. Toponce, 152 U.S. 405 (1894); Fitzgerald & Mallory Constr. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137
U.S. 98 (1890); Denman v. Richardson, 292 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1923); Navco Hardwood Co.
v. Bass, 214 Ala. 553, 108 So. 452 (1925); Mortensen v. Ballard, 218 Ark. 459, 236 S.W.2d
1006 (1951). See generally 19 AM. Jua. 2D Corporations § 1401 (1965).
132. See New York Dry Dock Co. v. McCollum, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup.
Ct. 1939); Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N;E. 818 (1914).
133. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Ac-r § 33 (1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
701 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
134. Proxy disclosure of executive compensation on Securities Exchange Act schedule
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B. Indemnification as Immunity
The judicially developed doctrine of governmental immunity13G is functionally equivalent to corporate indemnification.
While governmental immunity insulates officials performing certain governmental functions from the threat of litigation, corporate indemnification likewise shields executives through the reimbursement of expenses. 138
The immunity granted to public officials thus bars the lawsuit
at its inception; the court must inquire only whether the conduct at issue falls within the immunized categories of governmental functions. In contrast, the "functional immunity" provided by indemnification does not prevent the lawsuit, but
rather neutralizes its consequences. The inquiry for the grantor
of indemnity parallels the court's inquiry into governmental immunity: whether the executive wrongdoing comes within an indemnifiable category of corporate function.
Both indemnification and immunity spring ·forth from the
identical fountain of necessity. The common law postulate that
public servants require protection in order to engage in essential
decisionmaking applies with full force to corporate executives, as
evidenced by the frantic efforts of corporations to procure state
indemnification statutes after the McCollum decision. 137 The
need for indemnification to attract qualified managers to executive positions resembles, in certain respects, the need for governmental immunity with respect to officers who may not enjoy the
alluring salaries and privileges provided their corporate counterparts. Given the commonality of the two doctrines, a comparison
of the protection afforded by each suggests that the corporate
executive has been overinsulated.
14A mandates only the listing of salary and benefits, contingent remuneration, and stock
gains accrued by the exercise of options and appreciation rights. See How Much Does
the Boss Make?, FORBES, June 8, 1981, at 114. The SEC does require indemnification
disclosure on form 10-K, item 11, but only concerning the availability of the indemnity,
not the amounts or the recipients.
135. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExT § 26 (1972 & Supp. 1980).
136. One very significant difference between governmental immunity and corporate
indemnification arises from the perspective of the plaintiff: an injured party will receive
compensation from the wrongdoing executive who later receives indemnification from
the corporation, but there will be no compensation available should a government official
be able to assert qualified immunity as a defense. This Article, however, focuses upon
indemnity and immunity from the perspective of the protected officer or executive,
rather than from the perspective _of damage-seeking plaintiffs.
137. See notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra.
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C. The Waning Immunity of Public Officials
The Supreme Court's approach in Barr v. Matteo 138 exemplifies the traditional common law rule that public officials acting
in their traditional governmental capacities should be absolutely
immune from personal liability. The acting director of a federal
agency had been sued for malicious defamation allegedly committed in issuing a press release announcing the plaintiff's suspension for misconduct. A plurality139 of the Court found the
press release to be within the outer perimeters of the director's
line of duty, and therefore accorded the defendant - an officer
of high rank exercising a discretionary function - absolute immunity from tort liability for defamation. 140 The Court relied
heavily upon the sentiment, expressed previously by Judge
Learned Hand, that it would be "better to leave unredressed the
wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try
to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation." 141
Beginning with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 142 however, courts began shifting
away from the absolute immunity rule. In Bivens, where federal
narcotics agents were held liable for conducting a warrantless
search in violation of the fourth amendment, the court held that
federal officials committing constitutional torts would enjoy only
a qualified immunity from suit, which would depend upon a defendant's good-faith belief in the lawfulness of the conduct. 143
138. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
139. The 5-4 decision consisted of a plurality opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, joined
by three other Justices. Mr. Justice Black concurred in a separate opinion which emphasized the public interest in encouraging federal employees to express ideas concerning
the proper operation of government.
140. 360 U.S. at 574-75; see Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). In Spalding, the
Postmaster General was sued for circulating among postmasters a notice that defamed
the plaintiff and interfered with his contractual relationships. The issue was raised
whether the malicious motive of the officer would render that officer liable in damages
for injury inflicted by his conduct that otherwise was within the scope of his authority.
The Court concluded that the head of a department could not be held liable in a civil
suit for damages on account of official communications made by him with respect to
matters within his authority. The Postmaster General issuing th~ circulars "did not exceed his authority, nor pass the line of his duty.••• The motive that impelled him to do
that of which the plaintiff complains is therefore wholely immaterial." Id. at 499.
141. Gregorie v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1948).
142. 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
143. Id. at 1346; see Tritsis v. Backer, 501 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1974) (Internal Revenue Service employees in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms charged with
violations of the fourth, fifth, sixth, ninth, and tenth amendments granted qualified immunity); State Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974) (customs
officers granted qualified immunity).
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Further erosion of the principle of absolute immunity occurred
in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 144 where the Governor of Ohio and officers
of Kent State University were sued for damages under the Civil
_Rights Act. 1411 The Court ruled that officers of the executive
branch would be immune from suit only if they could demonstrate the existence of a reasonable good-faith belief in the propriety of their official conduct "formed at the time and in light
of all the circumstances. " 148
In Butz v. Economou, 147 the Court jettisoned the principle of
absolute immunity, substituting a general rule of qualified immunity for high-level government executives. In a damage action
brought against the Secretary of Agriculture for alleged violations of due process occurring during an administrative proceeding, the Court rejected the Secretary's contention that highranking officials needed absolute immunity in order to perform
their official functions free from the fear of unending litigation.
Rather, the Court concluded that only limited or qualified immunity was necessary to ensure the uninhibited exercise of governmental functions. Thus, the Court held that executive officials, in general, were entitled only to the qualified immunity set
forth in Scheurer, and that "federal officials who seek absolute
exemption from personal liability ... [would] bear the burden
of showing that public policy requires .an exemption of that
scope . . . [because] essential for the conduct of the public
business. " 148
This clear trend towards providing lesser protection from liability to employees operating at the highest levels of government
raises the dilemma that the legitimate desire for subjecting government officials to tort liability may inhibit some conscientious
public officers from making decisions that would be in the public
interest. The ultimate resolution of this conflict in values likely
will be to shift liability, at least to some extent, from public officials to governmental units, in much the same manner that liability of the corporate executive has been absorbed by the corporation through indemnification. 149
144. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
145. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1976).
146. 416 U.S. at 247-48.
147. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
148. Id. at 506-07.
149. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV.
L. REv. 209, 216-17 (1963) (arguing for indemnification of government officers acting reasonably or in good faith).
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D. Should Corporate Executives Enjoy Greater Immunity
From Liability than Cabinet Officers of the Federal
Government?
The Supreme Court's decision in Economou provides a useful
framework for ·assessing the concept of corporate indemnification. Economou suggests that a corporate executive should have
some measure of immunity from liability, similar to that provided the government executive, to ensure effective decisionmaking. But in fact, indemnification insurance provides the corporate executive with substantially more protection from
personal liability than the government official obtains through
the narrow doctrine of qualified immunity.
In Economou, the Court made clear that the burden would
rest upon the official seeking insulation from liability to show
why public policy warranted more than a qualified immunity
from suit.1110 Extending this reasoning to the corporate sphere,
there seems little justification in public policy for providing the
corporate executive with the functional equivalent of absolute
immunity; indeed, considerations of policy suggest, if anything,
that government officials should be provided a higher degree of
protection from liability than their corporate counterparts. Government officials operating at the Cabinet level make far-reaching decisions that affect the health, safety, and security of millions of persons, while corporate executives normally face purely
financial questions influencing a narrower range of interests.
Moreover, the potential liability for faulty corporate decisions
can more readily be foreseen and quantified than the liability for
improper government decisions. In light of these differences,
highly situated government officials seemingly deserve more, not
less, protection from personal liability than do corporate
executives. 1111
If, as Economou indicates, absolute immunity from personal
liability is not indispensable to effective decisionmaking, the
150. See text accompanying note 148 supra.
151. A counterargument could be made here that government officials should have
less protection from personal liability precisely because their decisions frequently will
have broader impact. Thus, the argument runs, a greater scope of personal liability
would induce greater caution among officials making these important decisions. In fact,
however, increased personal liability in many instances does not lead to greater caution
in decisionmaking, but rather merely disrupts government functions. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 522 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part) (requiring Cabinet-level
officials to defend actions on the merits represents a tremendous consumption of effort
and is contrary to the best interests of the people).
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question arises why corporate executives have obtained such
favorable treatment. The burgeoning of corporate indemnification seems due in large part to the lack of public debate on the
issue, which stems in turn from the paucity of available information regarding the :financial and social costs of indemnification.
Many state statutes whitewash the informational problems by
permitting corporations to provide for corporate indemnification
that exceeds any explicit statutory authorization, without requiring disclosure of the essence of indemnt:fication- agreements.
The failure of states to mandate disclosure of these agreements
creates a significant obstacle to shareholders seeking to challenge the propriety of indemnification in questionable transactions. Corporate executives have been ingenious in suppressing
information concerning the extent to which they defend themselves, at the shareholder's expense, from the consequences of a
breach of duty or even gross mismanagement of the corporation.
Under the Economou rationale, corporations and their executives should bear the burden of demonstrating why a qualified
immunity, analogous to federal executive immunity, does not
adequately protect officers who in good faith pursue legitimate
corporate interests.
CONCLUSION

The law of corporate indemnification has been transformed
from its common law traditions into a doctrine which readily
permits a corporation to protect executives who engage in selfserving conduct having no benefit to the corporation or its.
shareholders. Director and officer liability insurance has been
widely used to circumvent even the least stringent limitations on
indemnification imposed by state statutes and judicial decisions.
Corporate officers enjoy effectively an absolute immunity from
liability, while in contrast, government executives receive only a
qualified immunity. Given that government executives make decisions more significant than their corporate counterparts, this
disparity in immunity is counterintuitive and demonstrates the
need to reduce the scope of corporate indemnification.
State and federal agencies responsible for regulating corporate
conduct should take the initiative in compelling public disclosure of information concerning corporate indemnification. Publicly available information on indemnification practices will be
the key to meaningful reform in this neglected but sensitive area
of corporatio~ law.
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